multinational command structure with command relationships for a coalition to assist Azerbaijan in defeating the South Azeri People’s Army (SAPA) and defending Azerbaijan from attack by Ahurastan from the Independent Province of Ahurastan (IPA). The United States, Turkey and Great Britain have offered to form the nucleus of a coalition in support of major combat operations for .
In response to the increased SAPA activity sponsored by the Government of Ahurastan, the Government of Azerbaijan has asked for help from a coalition of the willing in order to defeat the SAPA and deter conventional aggression by Ahurastan. The United Nations, which currently has a mission ongoing in Nagorno-Karabakh, has not yet passed a resolution authorizing the use of force in Azerbaijan. The order of battle for forces provided by the U.S. need to be determined yet in detail. However, U.S. And Allied contributions will be approximately as follows represented on Table 1. The effective chain of command is presented in Table 2 and Table 3. The key, number one politico-military issue will be to develop and justify a multinational command structure with command relationships for the coalition to defend Azerbaijan builds upon and plugs national forces into while maintaining as much coalition nation pride and autonomy as possible.
Recommendation-Due to the sensitive position of Azerbaijan vis a vis Muslim neighbors and the Christian nations of Armenia and Georgia, a parallel command structure is imperative. Of lesser, but an important concern is the reaction of Russia to the crisis brewing on its doorstep. This is especially so in the case of Muslim Azerbaijan to avoid antagonizing its Muslim populations or neighbors. In the case of Azerbaijan and Georgia, this is the reason that the vast majority of mission assignments for their national forces will be that of rear area support/security and logistical support.
Justification-Major limitations on C2 are those of national forces such as those of Azerbaijan that must maintain parallel command structures to avoid feeding the propaganda of SAPA or Ahuristani forces portraying the CTJF as “crusaders” who are coming in to take over a Muslim country. With Azeri national forces poised on the borders (at least publicly) in a defensive or support posture, this should give the lie to this issue. The U.S. can not publicly be a lead nation due to these political considerations
Constraints-U.S. And CJTF EUCOM EAST forces will need to keep a low profile on Azeri bases. CJTF nations on base should wear UN blue berets and blue helmets when and if the UN the deployment of MNF forces. Obviously, they will not do this in the field in tactical situations. Readers of this proposal will remember the removal of the U.S. flag from U.S. forces uniforms during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1991 to mollify the Saudis. Also, MNF forces must not mingle with the UN forces in Nagorno-Karabakh due to objections of the Russians. MNF planning meeting at all levels are to include Azeri force representatives and take their needs and considerations into account in mission planning unless to do so jeopardizes mission viability or MNF personnel safety.
are most benefited by the parallel command structure. The MNF best ensures the approval of the UN Security Council on its operations by maintaining national control by Azerbaijan over its military forces.
Disadvantages-C2 is easier in a situation where there is direct command and control over coalition forces in a